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Established tropes hold that reduced rainfall across the West African Sahel and savanna from 
the late 1960s onwards caused migration from rural areas to cities or to better-watered lands 
further south. It is argued that this in turn caused major shifts in the rural economy, social 
transformation, disputes over land tenure and use between indigenous and immigrant 
populations, and violent conflict in places. Alternative analyses, while recognising a role for 
environmental change in social processes, take a deeper historical perspective and offer a 
more diverse, nuanced view of causality. This debate is worth revisiting to help prevent 
flawed, sometimes fallacious tropes from informing development policy and practice. The 
chapter thus examines paddy rice cultivation in Casamance, southern Senegal, amid broader 





In the past couple of decades, tropes about the nature, causes and consequences of 
environmental change in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere have been challenged (e.g. 
Fairhead and Leach 1996, 1998; Leach and Mearns 1996; Stott and Sullivan 2000). Some of 
this work has taken a ‘political ecology’ perspective, broadly defined, rooted in a post-
structuralist view that scientific knowledge is not neutral and that its creation takes place 
within particular political contexts. Historical examples are cited from the colonial period 
onwards where particular (mis)readings of landscape processes, underpinned by flawed 
science, have been used as a basis to exercise power over particular groups or to justify 
development interventions (Fairhead and Leach 1996; Leach and Mearns 1996). The losers in 
such dynamics tend to be rural people, who often know their landscape best (if not in modern, 
scientific terms) but whose needs are not properly understood or supported, or who become 
subject to restrictions on long-standing agricultural activities. Misplaced development 
policies, which sometimes subtly try to engineer social as well as environmental change, are 
imposed on them, wasting limited resources to little useful effect. At worst, tropes of 
environmental change are used as an opportunity to relocate people or as a cover for dubious 
or repressive political projects. 
 One key battleground for such debates has been the West African Sahel and its edges: 
its complex, ever-shifting border with the Sahara desert to the north and its gradation into 
woody savannas and ultimately the forest belt going south. Recent decades have seen reduced 
rainfall and associated environmental change (including desertification) and evolution of 
different agricultural production systems, generating among researchers and policymakers 
new contestations about the meanings, benefits and costs of such changes. In some cases these 
contestations rehearse longer-standing debates about people’s relationship with the landscape 
3 
 
that date back to British and French colonial times (Swift 1996). At the same time, they speak 
to very contemporary concerns about environmental change in a warming world and its feared 
social and political consequences. 
 The chapter considers these debates as they apply to Casamance, Senegal’s southern 
limb, sandwiched between The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Historically an important area for 
lowland (paddy) rice cultivation, Casamance is situated to the south of the Sahel in an area of 
woody savannas. The focus here is mainly on Lower Casamance, the western part of 
Casamance and administratively now defined as Ziguinchor region, named for its capital city. 
Much of the landscape of Lower Casamance is dominated by the Casamance River and its 
delta. The region largely comprises sandy plateaux and ridges broken up by a network of 
alluvial valleys with richer, clayey soils. Some valleys are fed only by highly seasonal 
rainwater but many others are in addition fed by perennial tidal tributaries and backwaters of 
the Casamance River (Linares de Sapir 1971; Pélissier 1983). In this complex, deltaic 
environment, paddy rice cultivation requires sophisticated and labour-intensive hydrological 
management, particularly the control of water flows during the rainy season. The construction 
and careful use of dykes and sluices is all that keeps salinity sufficiently low for rice, even 
more salt-tolerant varieties, to grow in many lowlands, and allows some brackish mangrove 
sites to be reclaimed for cultivation. This is, as Baker (2000) highlights, ‘an environmental 
balancing act’ and the agro-ecological system described is sensitive to variability in rainfall 
amounts and timing within and between years. 
The discussion begins by considering two versions of the history of recent decades 
that underlie different tropes about the relationship between environmental and social change. 
One is premised on the view that ‘agro-ecological collapse’, at least of paddy rice cultivation, 
has driven outmigration; the other takes a more nuanced, longer-term view of agrarian change 
in the region. The chapter moves on to consider why the former trope continues to carry some 
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weight in development thinking in spite of clear evidence challenging it; while it contains 
some elements of truth, it is characterised here as a fallacy overall. The chapter ends by 
examining the significance of such debates in the context of renewed discussion about 
environmentally-induced migration. 
 
Two Versions of History, Two Tropes 
 
1. Drought, outmigration and agrarian change in West Africa 
 
The starting point for the first trope is clear in the recent historical record. In 1968, a drier 
period began across the West African Sahel and savanna that, despite occasional wetter years 
(particularly since the turn of the millennium), apparently continues (Grainger 1990; Hulme 
1999). Various authors have noted that identifying ‘drought’ (in the sense of an abnormally 
dry period) in the Sahel is problematic, given inherently large temporal and spatial variability 
in rainfall and inadequate long-term records (Agnew and Anderson 1992; Baker 2000; Hulme 
1999). The term is, however, used here as shorthand for what is recorded and locally 
perceived as generally reduced rainfall over the past nearly-five decades. 
The literature records various social consequences of the drought. With established 
agro-ecological systems no longer providing a sustainable living because of reduced crop 
yields and livestock mortality, it is argued, rural people have sought alternative forms of 
livelihood. They have turned to other forms of production or to non-agricultural activities – 
artisanal or low-skilled urban jobs, or trade – either in situ in rural areas or, for many, through 
migration to cities in the region in the quest for work. The populations of cities such as Dakar, 
Saint-Louis, Niamey, Ouagadougou and Bamako have swelled partly as a result of this rural-
urban migration, which was particularly high in the early years of the drought in the 1970s. 
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Others have headed south, following the more or less north-to-south gradient of increasing 
mean annual rainfall between the Sahel and the Lower Guinea Coast, seeking better-watered 
lands where they could continue to farm. In some rural areas receiving these southbound 
migrants, conflicts – sometimes violent – have occasionally flared up as ‘autochthones’ and 
immigrants have found themselves competing for the same resources such as land and forests 
(Reuveny 2007). The overall effect on communities affected by the drought, it is claimed, has 
been greater livelihood diversification. This has taken place within a broader restructuring of 
socio-economic relationships between city and countryside, mediated to a large extent 
through remittances and other forms of economic exchange within the extended family (Fall 
1998). 
Lower Casamance presents, at first sight, a familiar case study in the context of the 
drought. The meteorological record and local perceptions indicate significantly reduced 
rainfall for the period in question compared with earlier totals (table 1). 
 







Table 1: Ziguinchor rainfall, 1927-2000 
Sources: AJAC-APRAN 2001; Cormier-Salem 1989 
* Figure for Niaguis, 11km east of Ziguinchor 
 
The figures show a drop in annual rainfall of some 400mm in the drought period compared 
with previously. It is not clear, though, to what extent this has been accompanied by a 
shortening of the wet season. Cormier-Salem (1989) claims that its duration has fallen from 
five to three months but its mean length in the 1990-2000 period was 139 days (author’s 
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calculation from figures in AJAC-APRAN 2001) – just over four-and-a-half months. The 
distribution of rainfall within the wet season may also, however, be a factor influencing local 
perceptions here. 
Whatever the detail, paddy rice cultivation has undoubtedly suffered as a result of 
reduced rainfall. Here as elsewhere along the Upper Guinea Coast, the effects of drought on 
lowland agriculture have been mediated principally through incursion of saline water from the 
Atlantic further up the Coast’s rivers (such as the Gambia, Casamance and Cacheu). 
Previously, more abundant rainfall kept such water well downstream through higher wet-
season floods and higher dry-season river levels. With the drought, Baker (2000) notes that 
saline water is now found some 200km upstream from the mouth of the Gambia River in the 
dry season, and over 100km even in the wet season. Saline water penetrates at least as far 
along the Casamance River (Dieng 1999) and thence up its tributaries and backwaters, with 
the same consequences: the further salinisation, via irrigation or groundwater, of many 
paddies in Lower Casamance, reducing or totally preventing rice production. In Senegal as a 
whole, lowland rice production fell by 40% between 1975-76 and 1995-96 (Cruise O’Brien, 
Diop and Diouf 2002). 
Lower Casamance has also seen rural depopulation during the period of the drought, 
as detailed later, with large-scale outmigration of many Casamançais to Dakar or other urban 
areas in northern Senegal or The Gambia. It is therefore relatively easy to construct a simple 
trope of causality, with environmental change (drought and agricultural failure) driving social 
and economic change (outmigration and livelihood diversification away from agriculture). 
Certainly, all of the individual phenomena described – agro-ecological collapse, rural 
depopulation, livelihood change – are individually and objectively true. They have happened. 
But the relationships between them need closer attention to determine the true nature and 




2. Environmental variability, de-agrarianisation and social change in West Africa 
 
An alternative trope takes a longer view of the social and economic changes recounted above 
and it orders circumstances, drivers and effects differently in some cases. It does not deny that 
these changes took place but situates them more firmly and critically in their historical 
context. From a theoretical perspective, they can more usefully be understood as ‘“de-
agrarianisation” [which] is defined as a long-term process of occupational adjustment, 
income-earning reorientation, social identification and spatial relocation of rural dwellers 
away from strictly agricultural-based modes of livelihood’ (Bryceson 2000, p. 1). The ‘long-
term’ nature of shifts in livelihoods, mobility patterns and in society as a whole is now 
considered for the case of Lower Casamance. 
 Labour mobility is a long-established feature of the West African economy, pre-dating 
the Atlantic slave trade. But in the 20th century, the security imposed by colonial forces, the 
introduction of modern transport and the emergence of a free (i.e. wage) labour force greatly 
increased such mobility (Hopkins 1973). For Lower Casamance communities, this process 
continued from the colonial into the post-colonial era. Its history is briefly recounted here 
because of its critical bearing on livelihoods in the region, particularly among the Diola, the 
majority ethnic group there (Foucher 2002; Lambert 2002). Some Diola men and women had 
travelled to The Gambia to harvest forest products from the 1860s onwards (Linares 1992) but 
from around the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, such seasonal agricultural migration 
expanded. Growing numbers of young Diola men, particularly those from north of the 
Casamance River, went to The Gambia to undertake groundnut cultivation and to harvest oil 
palm produce and wild rubber (Foucher 2002). Within Casamance too, significant seasonal 
rural-urban migration started at the end of the 19th century, when French companies began to 
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hire Diola women, with their reputation for being able to carry heavy head-loads, to load and 
unload ships at Ziguinchor port and elsewhere along the Casamance River (Linares 1992). 
Such wage-labour migration by Diola women became well established early in the 20th 
century with as many as 1,500-2,000 of them involved. Women were more generally used to 
accompanying their brothers as poorly-rewarded domestics on the men’s seasonal agricultural 
migrations, usually to undertake groundnut cultivation elsewhere in Casamance. 
This helped set the scene for longer-distance rural-urban migration by men and 
women from Lower Casamance to northern Senegal (Foucher 2002). This began in the 1930s 
but it was really after the Second World War that growing urban job opportunities through 
‘Africanisation’ of the colonial administration and through army recruitment began to draw 
larger numbers of young men to Dakar, again particularly from among the Diola. The growth 
of urban salaried employment for men in turn created more independent job opportunities for 
Diola women. They worked in increasing numbers as paid housegirls or bonnes in Dakar (and 
Banjul), although again they had undertaken such trajectories on a small scale since the 
1930s. They were initially limited by poor transport links, which enabled Diola men to try to 
restrict women’s movements, but the completion of the Transgambian Highway (linking 
Ziguinchor to Dakar) in 1957 and the advent of economical daily bus services along it 
removed such obstacles. In the 1960s, then, economic migration to Dakar became 
increasingly general among young Diola adults of both sexes (Lambert 2002). Post-war 
demographic growth added to increasing competition for urban jobs: later male migrants had 
to seek work not just in public service but in the artisanal and industrial sectors; women 
continued to seek domestic employment and, they hoped, a salaried husband established in 
town (Lambert 2002). Economic overcentralisation on Dakar was (and remains) the 
overarching structural context of such migration: for example, Sar (1977) noted that Cap Vert 
(now Dakar) region, then home to 15% of Senegal’s population, accounted for 66% of 
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salaried workers including 42% of civil servants and 80% of employment in the industrial 
sector. 
Macroeconomic decline, however, was to change mobility and livelihood patterns 
further. The late 1960s and 1970s saw declining groundnut production in Senegal, resulting 
from drought and the withdrawal of French subsidy, combine with the more general impacts 
of the OPEC oil shocks and deteriorating terms of trade (Cruise O’Brien, Diop and Diouf 
2002). State wastage and mismanagement further exacerbated the situation of agricultural 
producers, accelerating rural-urban migration nationally. By 1979, economic deterioration led 
Senegal to accept a structural adjustment programme (SAP), one of the first countries in 
Africa to do so. In the 1980s, generous foreign aid mitigated the impacts of SAPs on the state, 
at least in its Dakar fastness, and consequently its need to reform. But in the 1990s, increased 
pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund forced greater state 
retrenchment and economic liberalisation (Cruise O’Brien, Diop and Diouf 2002). Decisive in 
the imposition of reform was the devaluation (by half) in 1994 of the CFA franc, the common 
currency of Senegal and most other Francophone West African states, reducing foreign 
buying power and having further damaging impacts on the countries concerned. For the wider 
population, the familiar SAP story was repeated in Senegal: better macro-economic 
management generally did not improve conditions for the majority. Agricultural development 
was an early casualty. The axing of the government’s agricultural programme in 1979, then 
liberalisation measures following devaluation, reduced agricultural investment, extension and 
input use (Cruise O’Brien, Diop and Diouf 2002). Other rural services were similarly cut. In 
Dakar, meanwhile, retrenchment of the administration meant drastically fewer public sector 
jobs. Foucher (2002) finds that, from having recruited an average of c. 3,000 people per year 
in the 1960s and 1970s, the civil service only managed to recruit the same number over the 
whole period of 1981-90. Job scarcity was again exacerbated by demographic growth, which 
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meant that more people were chasing these few jobs. This hit the Diola particularly hard as 
the niche that they had established for themselves, through a particular educational trajectory, 
was in the lower echelons of public service. The little recruitment now occurring was instead 
usually the result of natural wastage and hence to more senior posts. In terms of their 
employment prospects, retrenchment thus hit male migrants worse than women with the latter 
working outside the public sector, mostly as bonnes. Like the rest of the urban population, 
such men have been forced to seek new survival strategies in insecure, poorly-paid jobs, 
increasingly in the informal sector (Cruise O’Brien, Diop and Diouf 2002; Lambert 2002) in 
line with subregional trends. Female domestic employment is also a difficult existence: girls 
as young as 10-12 are poorly paid and find themselves exploited by employers, landladies and 
relatives alike (Cormier 1985; Lambert 2002). 
 For Lower Casamance villages, increasing outmigration has had two major socio-
economic consequences. The first is the increasing importance of remittances from urban 
workers, either in cash or in kind (as consumer goods), to those who stay in the region (Cruise 
O’Brien 2002; Lambert 2002). The second is declining agricultural labour. Men largely 
undertake migration in the dry season, but if successful jobwise they will stay in town. 
Women generally return to their villages during the wet season to help with lowland rice 
cultivation and usually return permanently once married. The supply of salaried urban 
husbands does not meet demand and the rate of endogamy in rural Diola communities 
remains high, even if urban employment means that women can now delay marriage (Cormier 
1985; Lambert 2002). For both sexes, urban stays have thus become longer and the children 
of migrants born and raised in town may well not participate in rice cultivation at all (De Jong 
2007). Since the 1950s, then, one of the most important parts of the rural workforce – young 
adults – has increasingly absented itself from Lower Casamance, at least during the dry 
season and in many cases for longer periods. Paddy rice cultivation has consequently declined 
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as the necessary male labour for the maintenance of dykes, and female labour to plant and 
harvest the crop, have left for the cities in ever-greater numbers (Cormier-Salem 1989; 
Foucher 2002). 
As recorded elsewhere in Africa, though, agricultural production in Lower Casamance 
has adapted to the changed circumstances brought about by outmigration (e.g. Potts 2010), 
which have prompted a shift from lowland cultivation to greater emphasis on pre-existing, 
less labour-intensive activities. These include the harvesting of palm produce, oysters and 
salt, and fishing on inland waterways; and the cultivation of upland cash crops introduced 
mostly by Europeans during colonial times such as cashews, mangoes, citrus fruits and most 
vegetables (Cormier-Salem 1989). Charcoal production is a newer livelihood, serving the 
urban market (Evans 2003). Cassava and upland cereals, including upland rice, millet and 
maize, have also become more prominent on the plateaux (Baker 2000): such crops have 
lower labour requirements than paddy rice as by contrast they are direct-sown and rainfed, 
even if at times their yields have similarly suffered because of drought. The less salinised 
edges of lowlands have also sometimes been turned over to dry-season kitchen gardening or 
to sweet potato cultivation (Evans 2003). In livelihood terms, then, rural-urban migration and 
its agricultural consequences constitute a move away from subsistence as the principal means 
of obtaining rice to various combinations of cash cropping, remittances and broader 
livelihood diversification. In the agricultural sphere, such diversification is, as noted, based 
largely on the expansion of crops and activities already established in the region, in some 
cases dating back to prehistory (Cormier-Salem 1989; Linares de Sapir 1971). As Carswell 
(2002) has observed elsewhere, modern diversification thus needs to be understood in its 
deeper historical context. 
The timeline of this process of de-agrarianisation must be emphasised. The changes in 
production and livelihoods described were already well underway when chronic drought 
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served to accelerate them. Labour shortages had already undermined paddy rice production, 
particularly from the (notably wetter) 1950s onwards when outmigration from Lower 
Casamance really became established. The effects of the drought, when it came, were 
aggravated by the breakdown of dykes neglected because of reduced agricultural labour and, 
later, by underinvestment in infrastructure due to economic crisis, SAPs and the region’s civil 
conflict. Environmental change is undoubtedly an important factor too but it sits amid this 
wider context and, crucially, it is historically more recent than the processes that it is 
sometimes claimed to be driving. Its effects on outmigration and agro-ecological systems are 
thus the result of complex articulations with pre-existing social processes. 
 
Trope as Fallacy: The Curious Persistence of Agro-Ecological Collapse Explanations in 
Casamance 
 
In the face of the evidence supporting the second trope, the first persists nonetheless, 
simplistically attributing outmigration from Lower Casamance to drought. This is apparent 
even among local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based 
organisations, allegedly closer to social realities on the ground (interviews, Lower 
Casamance, April-May 2004). Partly as a consequence of their engagement with such groups, 
it seems, such claims are then reproduced by international NGOs. For example, a report by 
one London-based NGO operating in Casamance notes, among other trends, a ‘[d]ecreasing 
surface area of fertile land [due to salinisation] to distribute to sons, many young people are 
therefore leaving their villages in search of jobs in the cities’ (MRDF 2002: 3). This is 
perhaps surprising given that a whole literature records continent-wide rural-urban migration 
and de-agrarianisation (e.g. Bryceson and Jamal 1997; Bryceson, Kay and Mooij 2000; Potts 
2010), attributed to a variety of factors but principally driven by economic and social change 
13 
 
rather than drought. The nature of rural-urban migration by Lower Casamançais also fits a 
pattern of seasonal or longer-term circular migration that is long established elsewhere in 
Senegal (Schmitz 1994; Fall 1998), even if in their case it is relatively unusual in its scale and 
particularly its generality for women as well as men – a phenomenon not seen in the north of 
the country (Lambert 2002). Similar patterns are reproduced, for men at least, across Sahelian 
and savanna West Africa (e.g. Hampshire and Randall 1998). 
Another contradiction evident in agro-ecological collapse explanations for migration 
is that Casamance has received migrants as well as lost them. Seasonal and permanent 
economic migration from northern, Sahelian Senegal is not new. Northern fishermen were 
present in Casamance from the late 19th century onwards and migration for fishing became 
significant after the Second World War, as witnessed by whole communities of Toucouleur 
from the Senegal River Valley who have settled along the Casamance River since the 1940s 
(Cormier-Salem 1989; Evans 2003). More generally, the post-war period saw increased 
immigration to Casamance: a 1951 colonial census showed that half of the migrants 
established in Ziguinchor were from northern Senegal (Lambert 2002). The completion of the 
Transgambian Highway, then the onset of drought a decade later, served to bring northern 
farmers, fishermen and traders to Casamance in larger numbers still, even while Casamançais 
were using the same Highway to head north. This has been a point of conflict at various times 
and places as nordistes (the term used pejoratively in Casamance for northern Senegalese) 
have been resented for exploiting locals or dispossessing them by various means from their 
lands. For example, the large Pata state forest, in Upper Casamance near the Gambian border, 
has seen its population swollen by mass immigration of Wolof farmers and Toucouleur 
herders from northern Senegal since the late 1980s (Fanchette 1999). The results have been 
deforestation – by the end of the 20th century, over half the 73,000ha forest had already been 
cleared for groundnut and millet cultivation – and disputes with Fulani herders and others 
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already using the forest, leading at times to armed violence (Fanchette 1999; Evans 2003). 
While this particular scenario concerns upland agriculture and pastoralism rather than lowland 
cultivation, it further challenges a trope that seeks to explain outmigration in terms of the 
drought reducing available livelihood opportunities. 
The first trope can thus be reasonably characterised as a fallacy: a false argument 
based on invalid reasoning and, in this case, where evidence exists that clearly contradicts it. 
The reasons for its persistence therefore merit exploration. Even if such discussion is 
necessarily speculative, two factors stand out. First, without retreating into essentialistic, 
‘cultural’ explanations, is the symbolic importance of rice and its production among the 
Diola, particularly (Linares 1992). When the author was conducting livelihood surveys in 
2001, some villagers in Lower Casamance would insist that rice production was their most 
important livelihood activity even where the rice paddies were visibly producing little because 
of salinisation and the rice being consumed in the village was largely imported (Evans 2003), 
as indeed has been the case for some decades in much of the region (Cormier-Salem 1989). A 
reluctance (or denial) on the part of older people to accept social change – that younger 
people have aspirations beyond staying at home and farming – is also probably a factor. De 
Jong (2007) describes, for example, how young people are chastised for not returning home 
from cities often enough or for long enough to contribute to agricultural production and to the 
economic and social life of the village more widely. The harsh, perhaps unpalatable truth is 
that they did not hesitate to leave their lands en masse when better economic prospects 
presented themselves elsewhere, even while retaining symbolic connections with and deep 
affection for their home villages (Foucher 2002). The fallacy in question, then, contains a 
strong element of historical myth, rooted in nostalgia for an idealised agrarian past. 
 It has material implications too, and a second factor important in supporting the 
fallacy is the role of donors and international NGOs. As already noted, these influential actors 
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may be too ready to buy into simplistic but plausible explanations for social change rather 
than have to grapple with a more nuanced, evidence-based analysis of long-term processes on 
the ground. The structures of such bodies – with global and regional head offices determining 
policies that have to encompass great social diversity across the vast spaces that they cover – 
further impede understanding of what is really happening at the local level. Studies elsewhere 
have thus shown that once a particular trope, however fallacious, becomes embedded in 
regional or global policy thinking, it becomes very hard to dislodge it, particularly where it 
appears to have a scientific rationale (Leach and Mearns 1996; Stott and Sullivan 2000). In 
turn, once a trope comes to frame particular development programmes, national actors from 
government to local NGOs seeking to access funding are all too ready to parrot the concerns 
that donors wish to hear. The result of this dynamic is that a fallacy may become self-
reinforcing as both donor and recipient end up pursuing the same flawed arguments, detached 
from the evidence base. In this respect and in the context described, though, there is a final 
twist to the relationship between global concerns and local realities. 
 
Why This All Matters: ‘Environmental Refugees’ and Misplaced Interventions 
 
The debate recounted so far sits amid broader contestations about the link between 
environmental change and migration, and contemporary development interventions that seek 
to address that link. Key here is the notion of ‘environmental refugees’, which has antecedents 
dating back to 1949 but became increasingly prominent in policy discourse in the 1980s and 
1990s (Saunders 2000). People displaced by environmental degradation came to be seen in 
some circles in the immediate post-Cold War era as a threat to global security and were 
estimated to number 10-25 million worldwide (Black 2001). A relatively quiet period 
followed through much of the 2000s, when security policies became dominated more by 
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concerns about global jihadism. More recently, while such concerns clearly remain strong, 
forced migration due to environmental change appears resurgent on the agenda of the 
international community. One international NGO report, rather melodramatically entitled 
Human tide, argues that ‘[a]s the effects of climate change join and exacerbate the conflicts, 
natural disasters and development projects that drive displacement, we fear that an emerging 
migration crisis will spiral out of control… [O]n current trends, a further 1 billion people will 
be forced from their homes between now and 2050’ (Christian Aid 2007, p. 1). In the run-up 
to the Copenhagen climate summit (COP15), the British Prime Minister at the time, Gordon 
Brown, claimed along similar lines that ‘[t]he world would face more conflict fuelled by 
climate-induced migration if a deal was not agreed’ (BBC News 2009). 
Critics have long argued, though, that the concept of ‘environmental refugees’ is 
simplistic (Black 2001; Saunders 2000). It ignores complex, interlinked, multiple drivers of 
migration and the often deeper histories involved. There is little empirical evidence for the 
claims made and figures produced, not least because of problems in analytically isolating the 
effect of environmental change on migration from many other factors. The concept is also 
tacitly rooted in neo-Malthusian concerns about overpopulation, particularly that migrants 
from the developing world will flood (like a ‘tide’) developed countries – a highly 
questionable claim as migration for environmental reasons often takes place over relatively 
short distances. In the face of such concerns and the lack of a strong evidence base, the British 
Government commissioned a research project, of which Richard Black (whose critique is 
noted above) was the chair. It attempted to address the issue in a broader context and the first 
key conclusion of its final report exemplifies its overall approach: 
 
Environmental change will affect migration now and in the future, specifically through 
its influence on a range of economic, social and political drivers which themselves 
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affect migration. However, the range and complexity of the interactions between these 
drivers means that it will rarely be possible to distinguish individuals for whom 
environmental factors are the sole driver (“environmental migrants”). 
(Foresight 2011, p. 9) 
 
In the context of Casamance, such a nuanced view of environmentally-induced 
migration should point analysis back to the second trope discussed. This is important because, 
away from high-level policy discussions, a belief in environmental drivers of poverty and 
migration continue to feed into development interventions there. For example, in Lower and 
Middle Casamance over the past decade or so, significant donor investment has been evident 
in anti-salt barrages, partly in the context of ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction schemes. Larger 
barrages are placed across the mouths of tributaries to the Casamance River, controlling and 
at times retaining their flows and preventing estuarine water from penetrating upstream, 
thereby keeping the water behind them fresh. With hardcore/laterite fill and concrete sluices 
and bridges, these are substantial pieces of hard engineering, replacing labour-intensive 
methods of hydrological management with capital-intensive ones. At a smaller scale and more 
softly engineered, there are also many local barrages constructed of mud and sand, sometimes 
with wooden reinforcement. These are typically the product of World Food Programme ‘Food 
for Work’ or local NGO projects. With these two types of barrage, large areas have thereby in 
theory been reclaimed for paddy rice cultivation.  
 However, taking a more critical eye (on the ground or looking at satellite imagery) to 
these spaces reveals that are rarely completely used. While those near to urban centres like 
Ziguinchor are more extensively cultivated, some large areas of reclaimed lowland, 
particularly in Middle Casamance, appear largely devoid of productive activity. Various 
factors can be cited. In some cases, the barrages have technical design problems that prevent 
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them from functioning well (interviews, Djibanar, July 2009; Evans 2009). Even if they do 
work properly, it still takes a few years before rainwater can leach rice paddies of salts that 
have accumulated through successive saline water incursions – time during which people will 
continue to migrate or develop other livelihood activities. Lack of seed rice among 
communities that have not cultivated rice in recent years has also been identified as an issue, 
with some interventions distributing this to kickstart production. But arguably the most 
significant bottleneck remains labour. The paddies are not cultivated because people have 
better, more remunerative work to do, either in the village or in the city. While, then, a belief 
that environmental change drives outmigration may justify such interventions, a broader 
understanding of the de-agrarianised context deeply problematises them. 
 Circumstances can favour a return to production in some years, though. In 2008, 
rainfall in Lower Casamance was as abundant as anyone could remember (interviews, 
September 2008); prices for imported rice had reached a high; and producers were, unusually, 
receiving support from a high-profile Senegalese government programme. Water levels were 
high in many rice paddies in the region and people were cultivating large areas. This seems to 
have been exceptional, however, and such levels of cultivation were not sustained into 
subsequent years. Still, this example does to some extent challenge the notion of de-
agrarianisation as a one-way, historical process. It is important to remember that there 
remains a functioning, agrarian economy in Lower Casamance, albeit based significantly on 
upland agriculture (particularly orchard crops) and with the livelihoods of most households 
significantly supplemented by (or indeed largely dependent on) remittances. Other examples 
from West Africa also show how circumstances can favour an agrarian revival (Fanthorpe and 
Maconachie 2010). It is worth adding that growth in urbanisation rates has generally been 
slowing in Francophone West Africa (Beauchemin and Bocquier 2004), as in much of sub-
Saharan Africa (Potts 2010), indicating how deteriorating urban livelihoods may be starting to 
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tip the balance of migrants’ economic calculations back towards valorising their rural lands. 
Whatever the case, it is clear that livelihoods are, as ever, dynamically flexible on the basis of 




Environmental change and its consequences sound attractive to development actors because 
they connect readily with global concerns. In such a context, it becomes easier to access 
funding for interventions premised on battling the effects of such change; trying to reverse 
historical social processes does not have the same leverage. The agro-ecological collapse 
trope holds that, with one of the key environmental problems (salinisation) tackled by 
investment in hydrological infrastructure, people should return to the land, at least if various 
other factors (such as subsidised agricultural inputs and favourable market conditions) are in 
place. De-agrarianisation theory and evidence on the ground, however, show that deeper-
seated processes are at work: a historically-established trajectory of rural-urban migration and 
ongoing social change, reflected in new expectations among younger people. 
How change is perceived and understood has direct consequences, then, for what 
development programmes are undertaken and how successful they are. The case presented 
shows how a simplistic model of environmentally-induced migration can lead to erroneous 
conclusions about multifaceted processes and thus to questionable policy decisions. The 
development (and increasingly, security) community risks repeating the mistakes of the 20th 
century, with fallacious tropes about society’s relationship with the local environment, 
particularly when they have a veneer of scientific legitimacy, being used to inform flawed 
interventions. One-dimensional terms like ‘environmental refugees’ belie much more 
complex social dynamics and obscure an understanding of how real people, with agency, have 
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long sought to meet their basic needs under the often difficult economic, political, social and 
(for sure) environmental circumstances of West Africa. Contemporary global environmental 
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